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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [UN](#) [AF](#) [CG](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: NORWAY PREVIEWS PM,S TOPICS FOR POTUS MEETING;

RAISES AFGHANISTAN, SUDAN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND MDGS

Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (SBU) Summary. In a December 8 meeting with Ambassador Rice, Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Larsen previewed the topics that Prime Minister Stoltenberg will raise with President Obama during his upcoming visit to Oslo - an action plan for UN Millennium Development Goals Four and Five and Afghanistan civilian coordination. Norway believes that an Afghan civilian coordination plan should be in place prior to the January London conference and left behind a non-paper outlining Norway's proposals. Larsen praised Ambassador Rice's efforts to bring conflict-related sexual violence to the forefront of the UN agenda and noted Norway's wish to work together with the U.S. on DRC victims assistance and capacity building. On Sudan, Larsen emphasized that the referendum should not be postponed and raised concerns about the precarious situation there. End Summary.

¶2. (C) In a December 8 meeting with Ambassador Rice, Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gry Larsen discussed the two issues that Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg will raise with President Obama during his visit to Oslo. Stoltenberg will ask the U.S. to be a strong partner in Norway's campaign to advance UN Millennium Development Goals Four, on reducing child mortality, and Five, on improving maternal health. Norway is currently working with the United Kingdom and the United Nations to ensure that a strong action plan is in place by the time the Millennium Development Goals are reviewed in September 2010. On Afghanistan, Stoltenberg will emphasize the importance of synchronizing civilian coordination efforts prior to the January 28, 2010 London Conference. Norway believes that UNAMA should be strengthened and other donors encouraged to "come on board" and allow themselves to be organized by UNAMA or other international coordinating bodies. Larsen underscored that the Joint Steering Committee should be comprised of UNAMA, central donors, ISAF, and international organizations. She left a non-paper that outlines Norway's proposals on organizing UNAMA and JCMB, coordinating international assistance and coordinating operations (see paragraph 7 for non-paper text).

¶3. (C) Ambassador Rice stated that President Obama shares Norway's urgency on the need for civilian coordination in Afghanistan, and that capacity building will be critical to make a lasting difference. Ambassador Rice agreed that UNAMA should be strengthened, while cautioning that it must recognize its inherent abilities and limitations. She noted that UNAMA's strengths include its political liaison role, humanitarian and election work, as well as reconstruction efforts. UNAMA is hindered in the coordination of civilian assistance as major donors resist coordination in the traditional sense. Ambassador Rice noted that approximately

seventy-five percent of all Afghanistan donors are members of either ISAF or NATO and that successfully coordinating these countries would bring significant progress. Ambassador Rice agreed that time is short and said that although donors should strive for optimal coordination, at a minimum there should be a transparent depository of information available.

¶4. (C) Larsen praised Ambassador Rice's efforts to move the conflict-related sexual violence issue forward in the Security Council and emphasized the importance of ensuring that UNSCR 1888 is operationalized. Larsen will travel to Washington in January or February to explore projects that Norway can work on with the U.S., related to victim assistance and capacity-building in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Larsen noted Norway's hope to hold a conference in the Great Lakes region with UN support that will coincide with both the tenth anniversary of UNSCR 1325 and first anniversary of UNSCR 1888. Ambassador Rice noted the gap between what the DRC government has stated publicly on the sexual violence issue and what it has actually done, and asked if Norway had concrete ideas for operationalizing the women, peace and security resolutions' mandates. Larsen responded by describing Norway's plans to encourage hospital construction and send victims assistance expert teams to the DRC. She also noted that France is training Burundi police on victims assistance. Larsen added that Norway supports Swedish candidate Margot Wallstrom for the new Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Situations position.

¶5. (C) Larsen noted that the situation in Sudan is precarious on multiple fronts and that Norway is worried

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about calls for the Government of Sudan (GOS) to postpone the elections scheduled for 2010. Ambassador Rice agreed that postponing the elections is not the answer, in spite of the fact that the SPLM is unlikely to perform well on the first run. The upcoming elections provide the SPLM a dress rehearsal for 2011, allowing it to build critical electoral mechanisms and structures now. On the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Ambassador Rice stated that it is getting close to "white knuckle time," pointing to the recent violence in Khartoum directed at the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political leaders. She noted that it is important to enhance UNAMID's ability to protect civilians and identify ways to increase pressure on the GOS. Rice stated that the U.S. and the international community have identified benchmarks for both the GOS and the Government of Southern Sudan, and intend to actively measure performance. The international community is also giving serious consideration to placing additional pressure on the GOS by either the Security Council or other states to spur progress on the CPA.

¶6. (SBU) Larsen concluded by noting her participation in the Central Emergency Response Fund Conference in New York the week of November 7, and Ambassador Rice praised Norway's announced \$58 million contribution to the fund. Larsen explained that Norway believes that it is important to signal that in spite of the economic crisis, humanitarian donations to the UN will not be cut.

¶7. (C) The following is the text of the nonpaper on Afghanistan left by Deputy FM Larsen:

BEGIN TEXT:

The cooperation and coordination between the UN, ISAF and other international partners and the Afghan government should be among the key issues to be addressed in the lead up to the upcoming London Conference. Succeeding in Afghanistan will also depend on our ability to improve and strengthen our capacity to coordinate international civilian and political efforts. We need to consider different methods.

## General principles

The aim of our efforts should be to enable Afghans to fulfill their responsibility for transparent and competent management of Afghanistan's institutions and national and regional programmes. All major donors should step up international coordination and accept to be coordinated in order to avoid duplication, fragmentation and missed opportunities to strengthen Afghan capacity. Military and civilian efforts must be mutually supportive.

International civilian efforts in Afghanistan must combine legitimacy and effectiveness to ensure results. Enhanced coordination should produce more focused priorities, better delivery according to Afghan priorities and more accountability by both donors and recipients.

## Proposals

### UNAMA and JCMB:

Significant changes are needed in the way UNAMA and JCMB are organized and work. Today's organization around UNDPs not sufficiently robust to face the huge challenges and the need for coordination. UN's overall mandate should be protected, but UNAMA's key tasks should be streamlined JCMB is today unwieldy and ineffective and only to a very limited extent holds the Afghan authorities and ourselves to account. We should consider the following ideas:

**SRSG:** To maintain legitimacy and broad international buy-in, the UN needs to play a leading role. At the same time, we need to recognize that it is difficult to combine the political mandate of the SRSG with the role of coordinating international civilian assistance efforts. It would therefore be necessary to separate the SRSG's political mandate from the responsibility for coordinating civilian assistance. Assisted by a small secretariat, the SRSG should focus on the international, regional and political dimensions of the mission at a strategic level. Regionally, the SRSG should take the initiative to establish a mechanism for meetings between Afghanistan's neighbors and donors.

### Coordinating international assistance:

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**Steering committee:** The JCMB should be replaced with an international steering committee in Kabul co-chaired by a member of the Afghan Government (i.e. the Finance Minister) and the UN SRSG, and including the civilian representative in ISAF, the World Bank, ADB and limited number of key donors.

### Operational coordination:

Various options could be considered, all reporting to the steering committee:

- a) Strengthen UNAMA with Deputy SRSGs who are operationally in charge of development assistance, humanitarian assistance and administrative and budgetary affairs.
- b) Appoint three or four teams or clusters of donors and international organizations within different fields headed by operational managers, fully tasked to run and coordinate the international assistance and head the efforts of the international donors vis--vis Afghan authorities within their respective areas.
- c) Appoint a high level representative with ISAF, responsible for coordinating the civilian assistance channeled through the PRTs and for coordinating with other donors, international organizations and Afghan authorities. (We should be aware that such arrangement could be seen as a brake with some of the more fundamental concerns of international assistance and would be met with resistance

from many donors.)

International experts: Whichever option is being considered, the need for strengthening recruitment of international experts to assistance efforts in Afghanistan should be addressed. Nations should second experts to the UN or the operational structures suggested above.

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: Channeling a greater part of the funding through the World Bank ARTF would provide donors with a simple mechanism for coordination and contribute to Afghan ownership for social and economic development according to national priorities. We should work for increasing absorption capacity through this key mechanism providing consistent and successful efforts by Afghan authorities in their fight against widespread corruption.

ISAF: While military and civilian efforts must be mutually supportive, we think there needs to be clear division of labor between them. At the same time, civilian assistance is crucial to the fulfillment of our tasks in Afghanistan. It is therefore necessary for ISAF to strengthen its capacity and competence on civilian assistance as an integral part of our overall strategy. ISAF should appoint a high level representative responsible for political and civilian efforts with ISAF. The position should have a particular responsibility to coordinate civilian assistance channeled through the PRTs. This could enable us to move away from fragmented efforts by individual PRTs and set these efforts clearly within the framework of Afghan plans and priorities. The PRTs should-where and when possible-hand over civilian efforts to Afghan institutions in order to build their capacity and enable national and local ownership.

END TEXT  
RICE